Std 12 Philosophy: Core Concepts & Schools of Thought: 19 MCQs with answers

A · Philosophy examines assumptions rather than merely accumulating facts.

Philosophy is described in the source as the activity of examining assumptions, not merely accumulating facts. It tests the reasons behind claims rather than cataloguing beliefs.

D · It is the step that links premises to the conclusion.

The source states that an argument consists of premises (reasons), an inference (the step linking premises to conclusion), and a conclusion (the claim defended).

D · Āstika

Āstika schools accept Vedic authority. Nāstika schools do not. Cārvāka is a nāstika school, and anattā is the Buddhist doctrine of no permanent self.

A · Buddhism

Cārvāka, Buddhism, and Jainism are the nāstika schools. Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta are āstika schools.

C · Perception, inference, comparison, testimony

Nyāya recognises four pramāṇas: perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. Cārvāka accepts only perception.

B · Cārvāka

Cārvāka identifies the self with the body — consciousness is a by-product of matter and ends at death. Advaita Vedānta identifies the self with Brahman, and Buddhism denies a permanent self.

A · Virtue ethics

Virtue ethics, centred on Aristotle, judges the act by the character of the agent. Utilitarianism and consequentialism judge by outcomes; deontology judges by rules or duties.

A · True

Nyāya recognises four pramāṇas — perception, inference, comparison, and testimony — while Cārvāka accepts only perception.

C · The argument is not sound, though it remains valid.

Soundness requires both validity AND true premises. A valid argument with a false premise is not sound, though its form remains valid.

A · Deduction aims at certainty; induction yields probability.

Deduction moves from general to particular and aims at certainty; induction moves from particular to general and yields probability. Neither is universally superior.

B · Inductive, because it generalises from particular observations.

This is the source's own example of induction: it moves from particular observations to a general claim and yields only probability, not certainty.

C · You must say how you could know something before claiming what is real.

The source explains that before claiming the self is eternal or matter is fundamental, one must say how one could know that. This is why Nyāya focuses on pramāṇas and Western chapters often begin with scepticism.

D · Buddhism (anattā)

Buddhism denies a permanent self (anattā), replacing it with a stream of momentary states. Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā argue for a persistent self; Advaita Vedānta identifies the self with Brahman.

B · Could every doctor conceal diagnoses? If not, the act is impermissible.

Deontology judges the act by the rule or duty it follows. The universalisation test is Kant's categorical imperative. The outcome question is consequentialist; the character question is virtue ethics.

A · Nāstika means non-acceptance of Vedic authority, not denial of God.

The source explicitly warns that nāstika does not mean atheist — it means non-acceptance of Vedic authority. Buddhism and Jainism are nāstika by that definition yet are not straightforwardly atheistic in the Western sense.

A · Cārvāka accepts only perception; Nyāya accepts four means including testimony.

Cārvāka is the most restrictive, accepting only perception. Nyāya recognises four: perception, inference, comparison, and testimony.

D · All mammals are warm-blooded; whales are mammals; therefore, whales are warm-blooded. (All premises are true)

The first option presents a valid argument where the conclusion must be true if the premises are true, and all premises are indeed true, making it a sound argument.

A · It assumes all ethical theories must agree to be valid.

The argument incorrectly assumes that for ethical theories to be valid, they must not overlap in their perspectives, which is a misunderstanding of how different theories can coexist.

B · Nyāya, as it incorporates multiple pramāṇas including testimony.

Nyāya offers a more comprehensive framework by recognizing multiple pramāṇas (perception, inference, comparison, and testimony), which allows for a broader exploration of what is real.